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Significant changes in the agricultural sector in northern Mali suggest that irrigation has made a large 
contribution to welfare increases over the past eight years. Using difference-in-differences, propensity 
score matching, and matched difference in differences with a small panel, this study estimates the impact 
of access to irrigation on poverty, production, and nutrient intakes. The findings suggest that gains in 
agricultural production value do not transfer uniquely to household consumption. The paper tests two 
alternative hypotheses about the distribution of agricultural gains: (1) the gains in agricultural production 
induced by irrigation yield higher household savings, or (2) intra-village transfers from irrigators to non-
irrigators contribute to informal social insurance. The paper provides evidence of both saving and sharing 
within villages as complimentary strategies for consuming gains in agricultural production. This finding 
suggests that estimating the effects of a program, relying solely on household consumption, may 
underestimate the welfare gains of irrigation investment by ignoring the household’s savings and informal 
insurance network.  




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Empirical evidence suggests that irrigation projects have positive impacts on agricultural production and 
the reduction of poverty for farmers (von Braun, Puetz, and Webb 1989; Hussain and Hanjra 2004; Smith 
2004; Lipton 2007; and Hussain 2007b). Access to irrigation provides farmers with a reliable water 
source at critical times in the crop’s life cycle, removing the dependence and inherent uncertainty of 
rainfed and lake-based agricultural systems in arid and semiarid regions of northern Mali. This reduction 
in risk faced by farmers is likely not only to increase mean agricultural returns but also to reduce their 
vulnerability to income fluctuations. While farmers are exposed to unforeseen production shocks 
regardless of the production system, irrigation minimizes these shocks by permitting a wider range of ex-
post smoothing mechanisms to be used, which causes fewer distress sales of crop stocks or assets. Lipton 
(2007) reports that in India, irrigated areas had 2.5 times lower standard deviation of crop output per year 
during the period 1971—84.  
Because irrigation investment is not homogeneous between or within countries, this paper 
contributes to the literature on the impact of internationally financed irrigation projects on household 
agricultural production, household consumption, and nutrient intakes in northern Mali, an area that 
possesses few of the preconditions for agricultural growth, such as good quality soil, frequent and 
adequate rainfall, moderate temperatures, and sufficient infrastructrure. Most international attention has 
been paid to the Office du Niger irrigation scheme
1 in the Segou region of Mali. However, small-scale 
village-level projects (30–40 hectares) and larger-scale  projects (500 hectares) dot the inner Niger delta 
and north of Tombouctou into the Saharan desert, which is one of the poorest regions of Mali and an area 
hardest hit by the Sahel droughts
2. These irrigation projects are not investments by farmers in boreholes 
or wells for irrigating their personal fields; rather they are community-level investments that result from 
household, village, and international organization partnerships. Borehole or well investment by 
households is less frequent in northern Mali because of its arid climate, which results in a low water table 
and increased difficulty in constructing wells. The dominant type of irrigation project considered here are 
those that use motorized pumps to redistribute water from the Niger River throughout a canal irrigation 
system.  
The analysis in this paper is based on field research, including a multi-topic household survey in 
northern Mali, conducted in 1997–98
3 and again in 2006.  Because these data were not generated as a 
random experiment, several identification problems exist, which the econometric strategy attempts to 
control. The first is the endogeneity of access to irrigation due to nonrandom program placement. This 
bias occurs when intentional or implicit targeting rules are used to allocate projects to villages. These 
village-level characteristics are more likely to correlate with the explanatory variables if the programs are 
allocated either to highly productive areas to ensure program success or to less productive areas to target 
the poor. In either case, estimates of the project impact derived from outcome indicators will contain 
upward or downward bias, respectively, due to the group’s pretreatment characteristics. 
A second source of bias in program estimates is the selection bias due to nonmandatory program 
participation. Access to irrigation is likely to be correlated with household characteristics such as 
education, which may influence the likelihood of technology adoption or the ability of a farmer to lobby 
on behalf of his community for the intervention; access to water, which is a necessary condition for 
motorized irrigation; and whether households live in rural or urban areas, which may increase the facility 
                                                      
1 The Office du Niger was originally constructed in 1932 as a gravity irrigation scheme during French colonialism. While 
widely regarded as a failure into the early 1970s, a restructuring of the Office du Niger from 1979 to 1996 has improved the 
technical efficiency of the institution and increased grain yields for farmers (Couture, Lavigne Delville, and Spinat 2002).  
2 Understanding the effectiveness of these projects is not only of economic importance but also political importance. The 
Government of Mali has used investment in irrigation and infrastructure in Northern Mali as a strategy to bring peace to an area 
of social unrest caused, in part, by economic destitution.  
3 These data, originally collected by Luc Christiaensen with support from John Hoddinott, have been made available by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (Christiaensen 1998)   
  2
of program implementation. Program placement is not random. Unless the allocation of program 
interventions was intentionally randomized or can be viewed as a natural experiment, the distribution of 
observable and unobservable village and household characteristics between treatment (with irrigation) 
and comparison groups (without irrigation) will not be statistically equivalent.  
The econometric strategy employed to address the nonrandomized program placement in villages 
and adoption decisions by households within these villages is threefold. Difference in differences, 
propensity score matching, and matched difference-in-differences estimators are estimated, drawing on a 
growing theoretical and empirical literature on the estimation of program effects from nonexperimental 
data (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Smith and Todd 2005; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
2004; Jalan and Ravallion 2003; and Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007). As a robustness check for the 
propensity score matching and matched difference-in-differences estimates, four different estimators 
(nearest-neighbor matching, matching with 10 closest neighbors, kernel Epanechnikov, and local linear 
matching are employed to produce point estimates. Estimates of the impact of irrigation are robust to both 
econometric strategy and choice of estimator. Despite these robustness checks, it should be noted that the 
fundamental role that unobservables may have in driving these relationships is not adequately addressed 
by difference in differences or propensity score matching. Because irrigation investments were not 
allocated to villages randomly and participants were not selected into plots randomly,
4 the paper cannot 
completely rule out the question of whether unobservable characteristics drive the relationship. However, 
because allocation of village-level projects is predicated on proximity to the Niger River, there are strong 
observable characteristics that facilitate the construction of legitimate treatment and comparison groups.  
Besides measuring the impact of irrigation, this paper attempts to reconcile differences in impact 
assessments made using agricultural production and household consumption. Because increases in 
agricultural production do not necessarily transfer one-to-one into gains in household consumption, critics 
of irrigation suggest that increased input costs erode the benefits of irrigation projects (Kouyate and 
Haidara 2006). However, empirical evidence from other antipoverty programs suggests that if a 
participant’s time horizon is sufficiently short, the program may be viewed as a temporary intervention, 
yielding no changes in a participants’ permanent income (Ravallion and Chen 2005). This paper 
investigates the hypothesis that households may save surpluses in agricultural production by 
accumulating livestock. Alternatively, irrigators sharing additional food gained from irrigation with 
nonirrigators in their village could also explain the discrepancy between average effects of irrigation on 
production and consumption. Either hypothesis would understate the gains from irrigation if household 
consumption were used as the sole measure of welfare. As part of a study of potentially offsetting 
secondary effects of irrigation, the paper examines whether access to irrigation increases the demand for 
child labor and induces changes in household composition due to increased labor demands.  
This paper’s organization is standard. The second chapter presents a household model of 
agricultural investment and risk. The third chapter describes the data and survey area. Chapter 4 presents 
the econometric strategy. Chapter 5 presents the estimates of the direct effects of irrigation on household 
consumption, agricultural production, and nutrient intakes and discusses the secondary effects of 
irrigation, including livestock accumulation, food sharing within villages, household composition, and 
child labor. These variables measure potential ex-ante changes to household savings behavior, informal 
insurance networks, and labor demand induced by access to irrigation. A final chapter concludes the 
paper.  
                                                      
4 Although in most villages, after the irrigation scheme is built, participants are allocated an irrigated plot randomly in the 
village scheme. This controls, at least, for differences in unobserved soil quality among adopters.   
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2.  A MODEL OF IRRIGATION INVESTMENT AND RISK 
Rosenzweig and Binswinger (1993) propose a theoretical model to investigate the relationship between 
risk and agricultural investment. In this paper, the model is applied to irrigation investments made jointly 
by international organizations and village agricultural producers to install irrigation schemes. Sensitivity 
to risk is captured in the theoretical framework by modeling farm households whose utility function 
values not only mean consumption over time but also the variability of this consumption.  
Consider a farm household that maximizes utility over mean consumption, μc, and wants to 
minimize the standard deviation of consumption, σ c. The farm household maximizes a utility function V 
such that 
  (,) cc UV μ σ =  (1) 
where  0 Vμ >
 and  0 Vσ < . The farmer produces output by choosing productive investments i I , where 
1,..., iN = , such as fertilizer, irrigation, or high-yielding seeds. Meyer (1987) and Meyer and Rasche 
(1992) show that this mean-standard deviation approach is equivalent to expected utility maximization 
under the location and scale parameters condition. That is, when random variables differ only by location 
and scale, rankings based on expected utility or moments of the distribution are consistent. The farm 
household realizes a profit from investment decisions such that 
  (, ) i pfx I w x π = −  (2) 
where p is the vector of output prices for the production function,  (, ) i f xI , which produces a vector of 
outputs. The production technology,  (.) f , transforms inputs x, such as labor, purchased at cost, w.  (.) f  
has a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative. Agricultural investments, Ii, are assumed 
to exhibit constant returns to scale in the production function. Households allocate a fraction of their 
wealth, W, to agricultural technology. This is determined by the function g(αi), where αi is a vector of the 
value share of investment opportunity i from total wealth, W. This term g(αi)W does not enter the profit 
function as a cost because it is a portfolio allocation of wealth.  
Agricultural risk is characterized as a mean, μr , and a standard deviation, σ r. Then, following 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), the mean and standard deviation of farmers’ profits given by (2) is 
  () ir gW π μ αμ =  (3) 
  () ir W π σ ασ = Γ  (4) 
where Γ(αi) measures the riskiness of the investment portfolio.  Assume also the second derivatives of 
g(αi) and Γ(αi) are less than zero. Then the mean of consumption is  
  (, ) c SN π μ ημ =  (5) 
where mean agricultural profits,  π μ , are scaled by a function that allocates a fraction of mean profits 
between household savings, S, and intravillage sharing according to social norms, N. The standard 
deviation of consumption is 
        σ c = κ (W) σ π ,                  (6)  
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where κ (W) is a function of wealth that interacts with the standard deviation of profits, and it is assumed 
that κ’ (W) < 0, or increased wealth, mutes the effects of changes in the standard deviation of profit on the 
standard deviation of consumption. The standard deviation of agricultural profits scaled by a function of 
wealth [κ (W)] varies with the standard deviation of consumption to permit a wide variety of assumptions 
concerning financial markets. If σ c = σ π (that is, κ (W) = 1), the illiquidity of the asset market is implicitly 
assumed. The alternative assumption would be that σ c = 0, which implies that households can fully insure 
against income uncertainty.  
Since V is quasi-concave, the first-order conditions are given by   
  (, ) ( ) ( ) ir VS N g V W μσ η ακ σ ′ ′ = −Γ
 (7) 
Profit maximization requires that  ()0 i g α ′ = , since 1 () ii i gg g α + ′ = − , the marginal contribution 
to mean profits must be equalized across investments, given the optimality of farmer decisions. Since the 
right-hand side of the equation is negative, farm households who are risk averse, with a diverse portfolio 
of investments, have mean profits that will be lower than optimal. That is, farmers pay a premium to 
reduce risk, which is the difference between optimal mean profits and mean profits that result from the 
solution to equation (7).   
Consider now an irrigation investment that has a high fixed cost but a large mean profit return 
and a reduction in the standard deviation of profits. Farm households will clearly undertake the 
investment, given the quasi-concavity of the utility function if W > C, where C is the cost of the irrigation 
investment. However, if borrowing constraints exist and C is larger than W, which it will often be for 



















Equations (8) and (9) state, first, that for irrigation investment to be an efficient investment, the 
difference between mean profits from irrigation, aggregated across all beneficiaries, and the next greatest 
mean profit from an investment, aggregated across all beneficiaries, ought to be larger than the cost of the 
irrigation investment. Second, the mean variance of the irrigation investment for beneficiaries should be 
less than the mean variance from the next most profitable investment opportunity. However, there also 
may be cases where the difference in mean profits between irrigators and nonirrigators is large enough 
that, even if the standard deviation of profits is larger than that for nonirrigators, an irrigation investment 
would still increase social welfare. This case may exist because (1) learning by doing from newer 
irrigation adopters will create higher variability in profits or (2) the crop choice induced by irrigation, 
such as rice, has higher variance in yield due to its greater sensitivity to inputs (water, fertilizer, timing of 
labor inputs) then other rainfed crops like millet.  
What this model does not address is how households choose to allocate their additional surplus. 
Surplus from profitable investments can be consumed, saved, or shared with other villagers, as a form of 
altruism or quasi-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. In addition to testing the impact of irrigation 
investments on agricultural production, consumption, and nutrient intakes, this paper investigates whether 
households allocate unconsumed agricultural surplus to savings or to intravillage sharing. It also estimates 
the average treatment effects of irrigation on child labor, a potentially negative secondary effect of 




3. SURVEY AREA AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data for this paper were collected as part of the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in 
Northern Mali 2006 (Etude sur la Pauvreté et la Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006) conducted by 
the author. This multitopic household survey was implemented to study household behavior related to 
human capital formation and agricultural production in northern Mali. Of the 2,658 households in the 
sample, 245 households in the commune of Soboundou, Niafunke, that were originally surveyed in a 
similar study conducted in 1997–98, were resurveyed twice in 2006. Sample attrition from the 1997–98 
round was 12 percent, which is within the bound of attrition commonly found by other surveys (Alderman 
et al. 2000). Further details related to tracking households from the 1997–98 survey and detailed 
methodological documentation of the survey design and implementation can be found in Dillon (2005) 
and in the previous chapter of this paper.  
The data set is composed of a village questionnaire and a household questionnaire. The village 
questionnaire was administered to village leaders in each village or town included in the study. The 
household questionnaire was divided into men’s, women’s, and children’s sections and was addressed to 
the head of household and the head of household’s wife and children, respectively. Data were collected on 
a wide range of variables to analyze the household’s agricultural production, income-generating activities, 
livestock, assets, education, health, and demographic composition. Questions concerning the household’s 
composition, education, primary activities, migratory status of household members, and history of 
positive and negative economic shocks were addressed to the head of household, usually a man. 
Questions concerning the household’s food consumption, meals shared between households, and health 
and dietary diversity were addressed to women. Sections concerning possessions, nonfood expenditures, 
agricultural production, herding activities, credit, and time allocation were addressed to both men and 
women. 
Agroecological conditions throughout most areas of Northern Mali would not be favorable for 
agricultural production without the Niger River, which is the dominant ecological resource in the region. 
The inner Niger Delta is a potentially productive agricultural area in which flooding from the Niger 
augments water levels in temporary and permanent lakes and ponds, as well as smaller streams and 
tributaries. Land quality deteriorates as the distance from the river increases. Farmers harness water 
resources through motorized pump irrigation and the use of water-recession agriculture around the lakes 
and streams and in the Niger River itself, as its water levels decrease seasonally. Rainfed agriculture that 
does not depend on the water levels of the Niger River is also extensively practiced. However, rainfed 
agriculture is a difficult endeavor. The Saharan zone (a desert or arid region) receives less than 150 
millimeters of rainfall per year. This varies starkly with the Sahelien zone (a grassland or semi-arid 
region), which receives 200–600 millimeters per year, and the south of Mali, which can receive as much 
as 600—1,200 millimeters per year (Christiaensen 1998).  
Despite persistent poverty in northern Mali, it is important to note that the agricultural sector has 
not remained static over the past eight years. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of water control systems 
used by farmers in northern Mali. Since 1997, the agricultural sector has shifted toward irrigated 
agriculture, with a 30 percent increase in access to irrigation in the sample studied. While the utilization 
of rainfed agriculture has remained somewhat constant, producers using lake-based systems have 
substantially declined. The increasing number of producers using solely a lake-based system is swamped 
by the decline in those using lake and rainfed systems in tandem. The increase in use of irrigation 
correlates with the increase in irrigation investment by international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), which began making irrigation investments in the late 1990s, as a postconflict development 
strategy following the Toureg Rebellion.  
Production is highly labor-intensive with low levels of agricultural capital available to 
households. Median agricultural capital is approximately 32,000 CFA francs (FCFA) per household, or 
70 US dollars. Other factors that contribute to higher agricultural productivity include labor inputs, crop 
choice, area cultivated, and input utilization. The median household uses 225 days of labor to cultivate 1.4  
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hectares. Median expenditures on seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and manure inputs are 26,248 FCFA (US$58) 
with the majority of input expenditure spent on seed and fertilizer. These low levels of input utilization 
reflect a multiplicity of farming constraints, including limited access to inputs and technical capacity for 
appropriate inputs, as well as credit constraints.  
Table.1. Utilization of different agricultural production systems 
(% of farmers who use the different systems) 
 1997–98  2005–06 
Irrigation 0.4%  30% 
Lake 6.8%  18.50% 
Rainfed 35.0%  33% 
Irrigation and  lake  0.0%  1% 
Irrigation and rain  9.4%  10% 
Lake and rain  41.9%  6% 
Irrigation, lake, and rain  6.4%  2% 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
Notes: N = 246. The different agricultural systems are defined by the system that the farmer uses to water his plot. These include 
a strictly irrigated system, a lake system, rainfed agriculture, and combinations of these three. 
In the survey area, access to irrigation is facilitated by international organizations and NGOs who 
provide motorized pumps to villages at no charge or significantly discounted prices, which are then 
reimbursed over an extended period of time and with the condition that villages contribute labor for the 
construction of the irrigation infrastructure, undertake pump maintenance, and provide fuel for the 
pump’s operation. Irrigation is primarily used for rice cultivation, rather than sorghum or millet, two 
traditionally rainfed crops. Rice production that relies on irrigation is cropped once per agricultural cycle. 
Internationally, increased agricultural production from a dual cropping system is commonly cited as a 
benefit of irrigation. However, the arid context in northern Mali does not allow a second cropping season 
after rice cultivation. This is because temperatures in the dry season are high (in excess of 40º C) and 
receding river levels  make it impossible to provide the minimum water required for rice plants or other 
cash crops. The benefits of irrigation in northern Mali are accrued through increased water supply and 
control during the primary agricultural season.  
Table 2 investigates the relationship between agricultural production and household consumption 
descriptively. Mean agricultural production is 2.1 tons, compared with 643 kilograms using a lake-
recession system, or 288 kilograms using rainfed agriculture. Mean total annual household consumption 
(2,085,778 FCFA) is also highest when farmers use irrigation. Farmers who use ng rainfed agriculture 
have slightly higher household consumption than those who use lake-recession agriculture, but the 
difference is only 23,000 FCFA (less than US$50) over an entire year. The standard deviations of both 
agricultural production and consumption are higher under irrigation than under the two other water-
control systems. Differences in farmer’s skills may also generate greater variation in household 
production and consumption variables, because rice cultivation requires cultivation of seedlings that then 
must be replanted with appropriate space between plants in the irrigated plot. Rice seedlings are also 
highly sensitive to the timing and dosages of fertilizer. Despite the higher standard deviations of 
consumption and production, the high means of agricultural production with irrigation relative to other 
water-control systems indicates that rice production is not necessarily a higher risk investment for the 
farmer. This is because the standard deviation may not be equivalent to “risk,” when farmers evaluate 
both the mean yield and standard deviation of a different agricultural technology before adopting.  
Because of the labor intensity of farm production in northern Mali, lack of inputs, high rice prices 
relative to other cereals, and large differences (more than 1 ton) in production per hectare between rice 
and other grains, investment in irrigation is likely to have a high return. Table 3 illustrates changes in total 
agricultural production and nutrient intakes between the 1998 and 2006 surveys by village. The 
percentage of households with access to irrigation in 2006 by village is reported in column 3 of Table 3.  
  7
Villages with access to irrigation had dramatic increases in agricultural production and daily household 
caloric intake, with the exception of the village of Ouaki. For the entire sample, however, the mean 
household daily caloric intake increased by only 138 calories over the eight years between the surveys.  
Table 2. Total household agricultural production and consumption in 2006, by water control system 
Total Household Agricultural 












Irrigation 2,147.4  1,649.9  1,188  1,725.9  2,400 
Lake-recession   643  933.5  157.5  270  679.5 
Rainfed 288.4  283.3  121.3  196  406.7 
          
Total 1202.1  1473.5  196  620.4  1758.9 
Total Household Consumption           
Irrigation 2,085,778  1,490,314  1,180,530  1,938,500  2,615,860 
Lake-recession   1,356,355  844,554  698,200  1,141,015  1,758,480 
Rainfed 1,586,750  1,027,597  728,150  1,500,581  2,150,700 
          
Total 1,724,158  1,221,531  785,500  1,501,691  2,254,350 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006. Notes:  
N=246. Total household agricultural production is measured production of male and female household plots during the 2005/06 
agricultural season in kilograms. Total household consumption is the annualized household consumption aggregate calculated 
from men and women’s assets, non-food and food expenditures following Deaton and Zaidi (2002).  























Aldianabangou 15  0  61.3  156.3  8,354  7,752 
Tomba 36  68  61.1  2309.0  4,888  6,309 
Mangourou 27 0  154.3 192.4 5,295 5,588 
Gouaty 7  0  54.6  359.3  4,682  8,252 
N'goro 54  0  417.0  377.6  6,206  5,425 
Tomi 12  75  757.9  2,735.4  5,744  8,389 
Hamakoira 17  59  309.7  2,006.2  5,716 9,285 
Goundam Touskel  12  0  962.4  962.5  8,000  6,293 
Ouaki 47  28  1,060.5  1,022.6  6,833  5,639 
  Anguira  19  0  213.3  674.3  4,141  3,885 
Total 246  0.24  447.1  1,028.2  6,048  6,186 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
Notes:  Agricultural production is calculated as in the previous table. Daily household calories are imputed from food intake data.    
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Table 4 disaggregates changes in real consumption by initial quartiles to assess whether gains or 
losses in consumption were equally distributed across the quartiles. Total household consumption is 
adjusted using a Paasche price index of grain prices.
5  Since budget shares for the households in the 
sample range from 73 to 88 percent of the household budget, this approximation is an adequate 
representation of the real prices facing households. In all the villages with access to irrigation, the largest 
percentage changes in real consumption occurred at the lowest quartile. Changes in consumption for the 
lowest quartile with irrigation range between 29.8 and 61.4 percent, while the rate of change for the whole 
sample is only 23.3 percent. 


























N 15    Tomi*  12   
25th  Percentile  457,310 414,612 -10.30%    234,075  443,177 47.20% 
50th  Percentile  571,500 699,878 18.30%    347,885  672,364 48.30% 










N        Hamakoira*  17    
25th  Percentile  236,204 391,448 39.70%    177,560  459,855 61.40% 
50th  Percentile  398,780 487,046 18.10%    368,765  654,008 43.60% 












N 27     
Goundam 
Touskel 12     
25th  Percentile  252,360 355,582 29.00%    234,560  380,632 38.40% 
50th  Percentile  282,648 516,960 45.30%    362,880  526,776 31.10% 










N  7     Ouaki*  47    
25th  Percentile  70,485  214,187 67.10%    204,490  291,196 29.80% 
50th  Percentile  167,278 788,450 78.80%    341,265  430,489 20.70% 










N  54     Anguira  19    
25th  Percentile  370,373 272,836 -35.70%    110,740  199,824 44.60% 
50th  Percentile  603,695 416,862 -44.80%    188,075  285,570 34.10% 
75th  Percentile  963,610 563,961 -70.90%      364,305  529,828 31.20% 
     Totals  N  246     
      25th  Percentile 252,360  329,119  23.30% 
      50th  Percentile 399,070  482,522  17.30% 
        75th  Percentile 613,710  714,636  14.10% 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006. 
Notes:  *  denotes villages with access to irrigation. Total household consumption is the annualized household consumption 
aggregate calculated from men and women’s assets, non-food and food expenditures following Deaton and Zaidi (2002). Real 
consumption aggregates were calculated using a Paasche price index as described in the text.   
                                                      
5 A Paasche price index is constructed that is composed of rice, sorghum, and millet prices and quantities from the 1998 and 
2006 survey rounds, following Deaton and Zaidi (2002).   
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Figures 1 to 3 provide descriptive evidence of the differences in the kernel densities for total 
household consumption, agricultural production, and total livestock units held by the households, 
disaggregated by access to irrigation. The dashed lines represents the density of the comparison group of 
households without irrigation in 2006, while the solid line represents the density of households with 
access to irrigation in 2006. The shapes of these densities are relatively similar; however the means are 
clearly higher in the irrigation densities. These density estimates are only descriptive, in the sense that 
none of the selection bias is accounted for by disaggregating the densities according to irrigation access. 
In the next chapter, different econometric strategies for estimating the returns to irrigation on production, 
consumption per capita, and nutrient intakes are discussed, controlling for selection bias and endogenous 
program placement.    
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of total household consumption (in FCFAs) for households with 
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Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.   
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Figure 2. Kernel density estimates of total household agricultural production for households with 
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Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
Figure 3. Kernel density estimates of total household livestock units for households with and 
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Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.   
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4.  ESTIMATING TREATMENT EFFECTS USING NONEXPERIMENTAL DATA 
To estimate average treatment effects, recognizing the problem of selection bias between treatment and 
comparison groups, one ideally wants to estimate Δ = Yt
1-Yt
0, which is the difference of the outcome 
variable of interest at time t between two treatments, denoted by the superscripts 1 and 0. However, the 
econometrician is unable to estimate Δ in this way because a household cannot receive two treatments 
simultaneously. The evaluation problem is one of missing data, due to the impossibility of assigning 
households to both treatment and control groups. The econometrician is forced to measure the average 
treatment effect (ATE) given the observable data: 
 
10 (| 1 ) (| 0 ) tt ATE E Y T E Y T = =− =  (10) 
When data are generated through a properly implemented random experimental design, the 
expectations of the treatment and comparison groups are equal because the groups are  composed of 
randomly allocated members, ensuring that the distribution of observable and unobservable characteristics 
of the groups are equivalent in a statistical sense. With a randomized design, the selection 
bias,
10 (| 1 ) (| 0 ) tt EY T EY T =− = , equals zero, which establishes that the estimate of the average 
treatment effect provides an unbiased estimate of its impact.  
Randomized experiments are not always possible or plausibly implemented, so that absence of 
selection bias is a credible assumption. Hence, applied econometricians are often forced to estimate the 
average treatment effect on the treated households (ATT), given a vector household characteristic, X :   
 
10 1 0 ( | ,1 )( | ,1 )( | ,1 )( | ,0 ) tt t t A T TE X T E YYX T E YX T E YX T =Δ == − == = − =  (11) 
where, because 
0 (| , 1 ) t EY XT=  is unobservable, it is assumed that 
00 (|, 1 ) (|, 0 ) tt EY XT EY XT == =. 
Difference in differences, propensity score matching, and difference-in-differences matching 
estimators require identification assumptions with nonexperimental data. An important body of literature 
has tested these nonexperimental estimators against experimental benchmarks and against each other (see, 
for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Smith and 
Todd 2005; and Diaz and Handa 2006. Nonexperimental estimators can perform well if the set of 
observable characteristics is rich enough to create valid treatment and comparison groups. The advantages 
and disadvantages of these estimators are described below.  
Difference-in-Differences 
The difference-in-differences (DID) estimator is estimated by comparing the mean changes between 
treatment and control groups over two periods. The DID estimator controls for treatment group fixed 
effects by differencing. However, the DID estimator assumes that rates of change between the two groups 
would have been the same without the development intervention. The identification of this estimator 
requires the following three assumptions (Smith and Todd 2005). The first is that there are no differences 
in unobservables between the treatment and comparison groups E (εh1- εh0) = 0.  The second is that there 
is no interaction between the observables and the treatment E [(εh1- εh0) T] = 0. Lastly, identification of 
the difference-in-differences estimator requires that there is no interaction between the differences in 
unobservables and the observable characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups E[(εh1- εh0) (X h1- 
X h0)] = 0 .  
Difference in differences estimates control for time-invariant fixed effects by differencing them 
out of the estimates. However, there are potentially several sources of unaccounted bias. The first source 
of bias could be the result of the effects of program interventions on the comparison group. Because the 
original sample is composed of 10 villages within the same district, effects of the irrigation investment  
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may “rub off” on the control group. This would diminish the impact estimate constructed by making 
comparisons between control and treatment groups. However, due to the relatively large distances 
between villages and the paucity of public or private transportation, these effects are likely to be small at 
best. Four out of 10 villages in the original study are located on the opposite sides of the Niger River, so a 
physical barrier inhibits easy interaction between villages. The second source of bias is due to possible 
selection bias. If initial conditions that influence village- and household-level welfare are correlated with 
the selection criteria for program participation, biased impact assessments will result. In our case, access 
to irrigation is strongly predicated by access to the Niger River. Villages that have access to the Niger 
may have more commercial activities and lower transportation costs, which would increase their 
purchasing power. While difference in differences estimates do not completely control for this selection 
bias, using propensity score matching or propensity score matching along with the difference in 
differences estimates can control for the correlation between observable factors influencing household 
welfare and program participation.    
Propensity Score Matching 
To estimate the effects of irrigation, propensity scores are used to match households with similar 
observable characteristics, varying only the treatment, which is access to irrigation. Households are 
matched to each other conditional on a set of observable household and village characteristics, Z and V, 
respectively. Propensity scores are estimated to match households with similar observable characteristics, 
varying only the treatment—access to irrigation. The following probit model is estimated using a vector 
of household characteristics, Z and village characteristics, V, to obtain predictions of household 
propensity scores, where 
 
*
,, , , vh vh vh vh PZ V β γε =+ +
 (12) 
where        Pv, h = 1 ,  if P
*
v, h > 0              (13) 
                = 0 otherwise. 
Then the distribution of Pv h,, given Z v h, V v,h,, yields the familiar result: 
 
*
,, , , , , (1 | , ) ( 0 | , ) vh vh vh vh vh vh PP Z V PP Z V == >
 
            ,, , , , (| , ) vh vh vh vh vh PZ V Z V ε βγ => − −
 
                        ,, ,, 1( ) ( ) vh vh vh vh Z VZ V β γβ γ =− Φ − − = Φ +
 
      = 1- Ф(-β Z v, h - γ Vv, h ),               (14) 
where Ф(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
To estimate equation (14), household variables are used as controls, including household size, 
household assets such as household durables and total livestock units, the age of the household head, an 
education indicator for the household head and his or her spouse, an ethnicity indicator variable, and 
landholdings. Village characteristics include indicators for distance to the nearest road, distance to the 
Niger River, and the log price for transporting a sack of rice to Mopti, a regional center. These 
characteristics control for village development; access to water, which is a necessary precondition for 
pump agriculture, given the dearth of rainfall; and market integration. When the propensity score 
matching estimates are generated, the sample is also restricted to matches within villages, so that 
intervillage fixed effects do not bias the estimates. Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the 
household and village characteristics.  
These variables are used in the specification to generate the propensity scores that should satisfy 
the balancing property. That is, the treatment and comparison observations are tested to ensure equality of  
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observables across different propensity score groupings, so that there is an appropriate distribution of 
characteristics in each grouping of propensity scores. The assumption that 0 < P(T=1 | Z ) < 1 is satisfied 
in our sample and the top and bottom 5 percent of the sample have been trimmed, following Smith and 
Todd (2005). Figure 4 illustrates the region of common support from the density estimates of the 
propensity scores by treatment status.  
Table 5. Household descriptive statistics for propensity matching 
Household Characteristics     Education of Head (1 if yes)  0.11 
Access to Irrigation  0.23    (0.31) 
  (0.42)  Education of Spouse (1 if yes)  0.07 
Age of Household head*  3.86    (0.26) 
 (0.69)  Ethnicity   
Household Durables*   11.1  Peulh (1 if yes)  0.18 
 (1)    (0.38) 
Total Livestock Units  3.05  Village Characteristics   
 (5.69)  Road through Village  0.26 
Land (Hectares)  2.18  (0.44) 
 (2.80)  Road between 1-10kms  0.45 
Land Squared (Hectares)  9.23  (0.50) 
 (22.81)  River Access  0.31 
Household size*  1.40  (0.46) 
 (0.50)  Rice Transport Price to Mopti  2152.66 
         (568.37) 
N=242         
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006. 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Mopti is the nearest urban area. * denotes the natural logarithm of a 
variable was taken and used for analysis.  
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Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.   
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Four matching estimators are employed as robustness checks. These estimators include a single 
nearest-neighbor matching estimator with replacement, a nearest-neighbor estimator using the 10 nearest 
neighbors with replacement, an Epanechnikov kernel-matching estimator, and a local linear matching 
estimator. Both nearest-neighbor matching estimators are constructed with replacement of observations 
after they are matched. Replacement increases the quality of the matches by using more information to 
construct the counterfactual, but it increases the variance of the estimator by reducing the number of 
nonparticipant observations used in the comparison group. A nearest-neighbor estimator using 10 nearest 
neighbors with replacement increases the quality of matches but with the tradeoff that the variance of the 
estimator is increased. 
The third estimator employed is the Epanechnikov kernel-matching estimator for the average 






























where T is the treatment group, K is the kernel function, C is the comparison group, and an is the band-
width parameter proposed in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd  (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998).  
The last estimator is the local linear matching estimator, which is a generalized version of the 
kernel estimator. The advantage of the local linear matching estimator is that it is generally more robust to 
data design densities and has a faster rate of convergence at the boundary points (Smith and Todd 2005). 
These four estimators are used here to generate propensity score estimators, but they will also be used in 
the next section as a robustness check with the difference-in-differences matching estimator.  
Difference-in-Differences Matching Estimator 
The last econometric strategy to evaluate the impact of irrigation is a difference-in-differences matching 
estimator. Let the outcome variable of interest (agricultural production, consumption, nutrient intake, or 
dietary diversity) be represented by Yht for household h=1,…, N at time t=1, 2. Then variation in Yht is 
explained by covariates Xht for household h at time t. The treatment variable, T indicates the household’s 
access to irrigation. P is the propensity score estimated as in the above section using the probit model. In 
a pooled cross section,    
  ht ht ht YXT P β λγε = +++  (16) 
where the error term  represents an idiosyncratic (εht) error term. Because selection bias due to the 
correlation of program placement with household characteristics (assets, education, location, etc.) is 
probable, the inclusion of the propensity score controls for the selection bias of the observable 
characteristics when the impact of irrigation is estimated on the outcome variables. Using the predicted 
propensity scores and taking first differences with the panel subsample yields the difference-in-
differences matching estimator, γ
m.  
  21 2 1 21 () ( )
m
hh h h hh YY X X TP β γγε ε −= − + ++ −  (17) 
To provide estimates of irrigation’s impact that do not necessarily depend on the estimator 
chosen, the results of nearest-neighbor estimates with the closest neighbor, nearest-neighbor estimates 
with the 10 closest neighbors, the Epanechnikov kernel estimator, and the local linear matching estimator 
are all reported as robustness checks. These estimators were described above. All standard errors of the 
estimator are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions. In the next section, the results of these three different 
econometric techniques to account for selection bias and endogenous program placement are presented.   
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5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Impact Estimates using Difference-in-Differences and Propensity Score Matching 
In the difference-in-differences results (Table 6), the consumption aggregates for the control group are 
higher than those of the irrigation group were before most of them actually had access to the irrigation 
intervention. This may be because irrigation interventions were targeted initially to relatively poor 
villages. The difference-in-differences estimate between groups is 148,529 FCFA or almost US$300. 
Increases in the consumption aggregate of the irrigation group are significant at the 1 percent level. 
Agricultural production by households with access to irrigation has increased more than threefold over the 
past eight years, compared with farmers who do not have irrigation. Agricultural production for the 
control group declines slightly. Increases in the irrigation group are significant at the 1 percent level. The 
difference-in-differences estimate suggests a 1.9-ton increase for households who have access to 
irrigation.  
Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Results 
           Differences   
   1998  N  2006  1998-2006   
Variable   N  Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD    
Consumption Aggregate 
(Real)(FCFAs) 227  482,729  346558  246  541,155  294,436  65,225  * 
With  irrigation  81 427,961  343826  82 589,107 299,357  160,755 
** Without Irrigation  146  513,114  345494  164  517,178  289,891  12,226 
Difference   with and without 
irrigation   -85,152      71,929    148,529  ** 
Agricultural  Production  (kg)  246 447.1  879.1  246 1,028.2  1,554.6  581.0 
** With  Irrigation  82 589.9  958.5  82 2,472.5  1,845.2 1,882.6 
** Without  Irrigation  164 375.7  830.5  164 306.0  605.2  -69.7 
Difference with and without 
irrigation     214.3        2,166.5     1,952.3  ** 
Daily Household Calories  228  5,307.4  301.0  228  5,096.9  208.4  -210.5 
With  irrigation  59 4,398.1 387.0  59 6,234.8  474.8  1,836.8 
** Without irrigation    5,624.9 380.5  169  4,699.7 220.0  -925.2   
Difference with and without 
irrigation     -1,226.8     1,535.1    2,762  * 
Daily Household Protein (grams)  228  160.5  8.9  228  139.3  5.7  -21.1 
** With  irrigation  59 136.0  11.4  59 172.4  13.1  36.4 
** Without  irrigation  169 169.0  11.3  169 127.8  6.0  -41.2 
** Difference in protein with and 
without  irrigation     -33.1    44.6    77.6  ** 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
*significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. *** significant at 1% level. 
Calorie and protein intakes per day between households with and without access to irrigation are 
also displayed in Table 6. These results can be compared with the recommended dietary allowances of the 
Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academies, which recommends a daily caloric intake of 2,500 
calories and protein intake of 392 grams per day for active adult males (Otten et al. 2006). Households 
with access to irrigation have increased their daily caloric intake by 1,836 calories, whereas households 
without irrigation have decreased their daily caloric intake by 925 calories. Statistically significant 
increases in protein intakes are also found in households who have access to irrigation. The difference-in- 
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differences estimate is 77.6 grams of additional daily protein intake per household. Despite statistically 
significant increases in both calories and protein, households with irrigation still fall 18,000 calories 
below what would be required for the mean household of six in the sample, according to the 
recommended dietary allowances.  
Table 7 presents the results of the probit model used to estimate the propensity scores given 
village and household characteristics. Significant characteristics that predict access to irrigation include 
infrastructure such as roads and access to the Niger River. However, this is not a causal model. The 
specification chosen satisfies the balancing property and does not include all observable household 
characteristics from the data set that could possibly influence irrigation access. The use of the balancing 
property to include variables as part of the propensity score specification ensures that a comparison group 
is constructed with observable characteristics distributed equivalently across quintiles in both the 
treatment and comparison groups, as described by Smith and Todd (2005).  
Table 7. Probit model results 
 Irrigation 
HH Characteristics   
Ln Age of Household head  -0.026 
  (0.130) 
Ln Household Durables  0.012 
  (0.145) 
Total Livestock Units  -0.047 
  (0.035) 
Land (Hectares)  -0.343 
  (0.318) 
Land Squared (Hectares)  0.078 
  (0.071) 
Ln Household size  -0.17 
  (0.282) 
Education of Head (1 if yes)  0.114 
  (0.437) 
Education of Spouse (1 if yes)  0.08 
  (0.486) 
Ethnicity   
Peulh (1 if yes)  -0.551 
 (0.504) 
Village Characteristics   
Road through Village  14.168 
 (2.334)***
Road within 10kms  0.648 
 (0.679) 
River Access  14.6 
 (1.964)***
Rice Transport Price to Mopti  0 
 (0.001) 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
Notes: N=212. Constant is included. Mopti is the nearest urban area.    
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Estimator  Outcome Variables 
Household Consumption (FCFA)  98  775,674  734,908  776,748  775,673 
   (339,480)**  (270,311)***  (278,568)***  (320,187)** 
Agricultural Production (kg)  98  1,254  1,647  1,361  1,835 
   (351)***  (276)***  (341)***  (292)*** 
Daily Total Household Calories  98  8,428  9,205  9,796  8,429 
   (3,596)**  (2,916)***  (3,194)***  (3,697)** 
Daily Total Household Protein  98  228  281  299  228 
   (114)**  (89)*** (99)***  (108)**
Household Composition               
Men 98  .78  .906  .862  .776 
   (.530)  (.420)**  (.424)**    (0.517) 
Women 98  .286  -.178  .041  .286 
    (0.578)   (0.434)   (0.475)   (0.562) 
Boys 98  -.510  -.361  -.405  -.510 
     (0.491)   (0.340)   (0.375)   (0.497) 
Girls 98  0  -.337  -.082  0 
      (0.536)   (0.436)   (0.469)   (0.560) 
Informal Food Sharing               
Meals Given to other HH  98  .367  .690  .756  .367 
   (.475)  (0.363)*  (.390)*  (.487) 
Meals Received from other HH  98 -1.449 -.527 -.443  -1.449 
   (1.611)  (1.291)  (1.086)  (1.545) 
Net Sharing Indicator  98  .224  .204  .213  .224 
(1 if HH gives more meals than received)   (.087)** (.076)*** (.079)*** (.085)*** 
Livestock (in Total Livestock Units)  98  6.4  6.3  5.8  6.4 
   (2.19)***  (2.323)***  (2.05)***  (2.321)*** 
Children's Weekly School Hours  137  -12.4  -2.33  -1.014  -10.73 
  (children)  (6.68)*   (4.003)   (5.22)   (6.443)* 
Children's Weekly Farm Work Hours  137  7.15  4.42  6.82  3.36 
   (children) (5.26)  (4.657)  (4.207)  (4.86) 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
Note: All standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 8 reports the estimates of the four matching estimators specified for consumption, 
agricultural production, and nutrient intakes.
6  The results indicate significant effects when either 
propensity score matching or the difference-in-differences estimator are calculated. However, the 
magnitudes of the effects estimated with propensity score matching are larger than the difference-in-
                                                      
6 The Stata command psmatch2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) is used to estimate the treatment effects in the 
empirical section.   
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differences estimates. Consumption is significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels across the different 
matching estimators. The effect of irrigation on the household total consumption aggregate varies from 
734,908 to 776,748 FCFA, depending on the estimator used.  Total agricultural production, total daily 
caloric intakes, and total daily protein intakes are significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels. The effect of 
irrigation on total agricultural production ranges from 1.25 to 1.83 tons per household. Increases in 
calories and protein per week are also statistically significant.  
Lastly, the matched difference-in-differences estimator, using propensity scores to control for the 
endogeneity of access to irrigation, is estimated in Table 9, which presents the average treatment effects 
on the treated. The difference-in-differences matching estimates indicate that the impact of irrigation on 
consumption ranges from 694,921 to 739,050 FCFA. Estimates of the impact of irrigation on agricultural 
production range from 1.17 to 1.89 tons per household. The impact of total household calories and protein 
intakes per week are also statistically significant across the matching estimators, although the matched 
difference-in-differences estimates are greater across all estimators. The propensity score matching 
estimates and matched difference in differences are similar, despite variations in the estimators and 
evaluation techniques. 














Differences in the Outcome Variables 
(1998-2006) 
Household Consumption (FCFA)  98  738,148  694,921  739,050  738,148 
   (310093)**  (274,938)**  (292275)**  (318,645)** 
Agricultural Production (kg)  98  1,170  1,591  1,284  1,888 
   (367)***  (288)***  (341)***  (295)*** 
Daily Total Household Calories  98  11,371  10,494  10,618  11,371 
   (4862)**  (3,742)***  (4,230)**  (4,611)** 
Daily Total Household Protein  98  360  326  328  361 
   (141)**  (115)***  (126)**  (144)** 
Livestock (in Total Livestock Units)  98  6.6  6.4  6.2  6.6 
   (2.13)***  (2.07)***  (2.03)***  (2.19)*** 
Household Composition          
Men 98  .429  .733  .625  .429 
   (.483)  (.364)**  (.370)*  (.444)** 
Women 98  .265  -.139  .106  .265 
   (.585)  (.449)  (.514)  (.601) 
Boys 98  -.326  -.237  -.073  -.327 
   (.548)  (.411)  (.439)  (.550) 
Girls 98  -.061  -.112  .187  -.061 
     (.587)  (.438)  (.471)  (.605) 
Data Source:  Author’s Calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006.  
Note: All standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions. 
* Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
Differences in the Impact of Irrigation on Household Agricultural Production and 
Consumption  
Despite the robust response of the estimates to different estimators on the impact of irrigation on 
household agricultural production and total consumption, the benefits of agricultural production induced 
by irrigation technology do not transfer one-to-one into gains in household consumption. The lack of  
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unity between production and consumption potentially presents a problem in establishing irrigation’s 
impact on poverty reduction, because gains in agricultural production could be offset by higher input 
costs, which erode the benefits of irrigation technology and are reflected in lower household consumption.  
There are two hypotheses that could explain this pattern in the data. Consuming the gains from 
increased agricultural production from irrigation may not be the only household strategy for increasing 
welfare. Households could also save these gains or share some of them with others in their village, either 
for purely altruistic reasons or as an informal kind of intravillage insurance against future shocks. 
Empirical evidence for the saving hypothesis is found in other studies. Ravallion and Chen (2005) found 
that antipoverty programs in southwest China had little impact on consumption but a large impact on 
household saving, because the community expected that the program’s duration would be short.  
To test the hypotheses of increased savings or increased intravillage sharing, the estimates of a 
standardized asset, livestock, reported in total livestock units (TLUs) and the number of meals shared and 
received are estimated using propensity score matching. The evaluation estimators support both 
hypotheses: saving via livestock accumulation and sharing of meals both increased. Irrigation 
significantly increases livestock holdings by 5.8 to 6.4 TLUs using propensity score matching and 6.2 to 
6.6 TLUs with matched difference in differences (Table 8). Meals given to other households significantly 
increase by 0.69 to 0.76 meals per week, while the number of meals received did not change with any 
statistical significance (Table 9). According to a net sharing indicator that represents 1 if the household is 
a net sharer, or 0 if the household receives more meals than it gives, households were 20.0–22.4 percent 
more likely to be net sharers if they had access to irrigation.  
In addition to these variables, the number of hours children spend in school and on farm work and 
changes in household composition are evaluated as outcome variables, using propensity score matching in 
Table 8. Child labor could plausibly increase with the introduction of irrigation technology because the 
demand for household labor will increase as the household responds to more lucrative income 
opportunities, which increase the opportunity costs of children’s time. While there was no effect on the 
hours children spent on farming, hours spent on schooling did decrease in households with access to 
irrigation by 10.7 to 12.4 hours per week in two of the estimators used. Decreased hours of schooling 
have potentially serious long-term implications for human capital accumulation. Another outcome 
variable that may erode the effects of increased agricultural production on household consumption is 
household composition changes that increase household size in response to the increased labor demands 
that irrigated agriculture necessitates. In Table 8, the propensity score matching estimates illustrate that in 
households with access to irrigation, the number of men in the household increased by almost one 
additional member, while there was no effect on the number of women, boys, or girls.  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the estimation method used to evaluate irrigation investments in northern Mali, significant 
positive increases in total household consumption, agricultural production, and caloric and protein intakes 
are estimated for households who have access to irrigation. These results reinforce previous studies on 
smallholder irrigation investments by showing that, in an area with low agricultural potential, welfare 
gains can be realized with targeted investment (Lipton, Litchfield, and Faurès 2003; Hussain 2007b). 
Irrigation investment also induces households to save more and share more within their villages, which is 
a type of investment in informal social insurance. Both of these responses to irrigation are effects not 
captured by estimating program effects using consumption aggregates.  
In future work, a major interest will be to investigate the role that village-level investments in 
irrigation have in reducing inequality within villages and households. Because irrigation interventions are 
primarily targeted at the village level in northern Mali, this may promote greater reductions in poverty 
and inequality than larger-scale projects that are primarily targeted to larger urban population centers. 
Because male and female expenditure data were collected, investigating the impact of irrigation on 
intrahousehold inequality may also yield important insights into household behavior. Differences in 
welfare gains between genders may be of particular concern because most irrigation projects are targeted 
to men. If irrigated plots require more labor, then women may be drawn away from their plots to work on 
irrigated plots, for which they do not control the output.  
This paper provides direct evidence about the returns to irrigation by tracking households from 10 
villages over an eight-year period. Small-scale irrigation projects can have significant impacts on 
household consumption, agricultural production, and nutrition. In an environment such as northern Mali, 
where the Sahelian droughts have been severe and agroecological conditions are not favorable to rainfed 
agriculture, a green revolution is possible if villages harness the water provided by the Niger River. Not 
only do irrigation projects increase village food supply, but they also reinforce informal sharing within 
villages and help households build assets that may serve to buffer consumption against transitory income 
fluctuations, particularly during the lean season. These secondary effects of irrigation projects can be 
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